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Abstract
This essay examines epistemological tensions inherent in the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG) project. The clash between the totalizing logic of the SDGs and growing populist 
antipathy for expert governance can be better understood and potentially mediated through a 
critical pragmatist view. For the SDGs, technocratic fundamentalism not only serves the am-
bition for universality but also ensures epistemic stability in problem framing and protects 
the interests that benefit from it. However, technocratic fundamentalism also undermines the 
mechanics of SDG localization, working against their stated aims of justice, transparency, and 
institutional equity; in this way, a global development agenda shaped by myopic epistemics 
does itself no favors on elements by which it proposes to be measured. Compounding these 
epistemic tensions, anti-expert and anti-intellectual populism is confronting the credibility of 
technocracy and governance more generally, with possible implications for national and lo-
cal policymaking informed by the SDGs. The concept of critical pragmatism, as articulated by 
Forester, presents both a provocation to the SDG project and a vision for imparting a more 
participatory orientation to it. This essay elaborates on these points.
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1. SDG technocracy: process, program, and politics
At the UN’s Third International Conference on Financing for Development in 2015, Co-Fa-
cilitator George Talbot, the Permanent Representative of Guyana, stated about financing the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that “politics cannot always be anticipated and are best 
left to the politicians, who should be allowed to resolve the remaining issues” (Leone 2015). 
This statement instantiates the tension between technocracy and politics in global develop-
ment. While the SDGs reflect a totalizing and rationalist1 vision for advancing policy goals, 
operational guidance on local implementation is suggested by an array of over 200 indicators2 
that act in effect as policy nudges (Hartley 2019). In this way, the translation of a global de-
velopment vision into highly contextualized settings illustrates the core-periphery dynamic 
long characterizing development initiatives. It also reveals new opportunities to understand 
tensions between technocratic authority and the current era’s rising assertiveness of local and 
national identity movements. This essay begins by examining SDG technocracy through the 
lens of Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) three dimensions of policy success. It continues with a 
discussion about the role of technocracy in framing policy issues and the inherent epistemic 
instability that attends it. The essay concludes by examining ‘critical pragmatism’ as both a 
diagnostic and prescriptive tool for SDG localization. 
At a theoretical level, the SDGs are the 21st century expression of the ‘modern project’ – an 
Enlightenment-style agenda that, despite its claimed independence from dogma, embraces the 
rule-sets of rationalism, liberalism, and internationalism (Dunne 2010). Actualizing the total-
izing and rationalist vision of the SDGs is a ‘positivist’ and ‘technocratic’ orientation. Positiv-
ism refers here to a theory of knowledge in which “reality exists and is driven by laws of cause 
and effect that can be discovered through empirical testing of hypotheses” (Fischer 1998; p. 
143); positivism can manifest itself as a paradigm (Kuhn 1962) or a ‘culture’ (Ryan 2015). 
Technocracy applies positivist perspectives to understanding and addressing policy problems, 
with theoretical roots in the policy sciences, managerialism, and public choice theory (Fischer 
1990). 
In practice, the SDG apparatus comprises cadres of technocrats and experts generating policy 
ideas and ways to measure their implementation.3 Viewed critically, such cadres substantiate 
their advice through the credentials of their members while having the effect of de-platforming 
alternative ideas and perspectives at the agenda-setting stage. These cadres also appear to up-
hold, consciously or otherwise, a deeply embedded epistemological legacy (i.e., positivism) that 
shapes policy thinking. However, the logic of these efforts is confronted by ongoing scholarly 
critiques of policy knowledge construction as a biased exercise. According to Kuecker and Hart-
ley (2020a):
The vestiges of Enlightenment rationalism continue to privilege the problem-solving 
epistemic, as perpetuated by the power-knowledge nexus and valorized by ‘common-
sense’ narratives about evidence-based policy. In a credibility-generating and self-
referential feedback loop, experts define the parameters of policy advice, fortify 
themselves against competing or alternative forms of knowledge, and leverage the 
resulting monopoly on influence to re-assert validation (p. 5).
1 — Substituting for the term ‘rational,’ ‘rationalist’ implies a distinctive epistemological orientation that invokes the 
objectivity of ‘rationality’ to legitimize philosophies or practices based on underlying value-frames.
2 — https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/11803Official-List-of-Proposed-SDG-Indicators.pdf
 (accessed 22 July 2020).
3 — This cadre is constitutive of a broader ‘power-knowledge nexus’ that includes creators of knowledge (scholars and consult-
ants), influencers of policy (lobbyists and advocacy-focused think tanks; see Abelson 2019), shapers of public opinion (the com-
mentariat and ‘public intellectuals’), and facilitators of policy reality (politicians and policymakers), among others.
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The power-knowledge nexus and its constituent technocratic cadres, whether within the SDG 
apparatus or elsewhere, exist in no value-free vacuum (Sen 2004). The nexus frames problem 
definitions to fit solutions that serve particular interests, with a common example being the 
narrative about inefficiency in government-provided public services and the primacy of mar-
ket paradigms in addressing it (see New Public Management; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The 
nexus also adaptively protects its legitimacy by co-opting emergent political sentiments, as 
evident in deference to virtues like inclusion, deliberation, and participation expressed by post-
New Public Management paradigms (see New Public Service; Denhardt and Denhardt 2000). In 
policy practice and in the political economy of sustainability more broadly, the substantial and 
largely unchallenged influence of mainstream governance paradigms, the logic of coordinated 
and totalizing global policy initiatives, and the maneuvers of the power-knowledge nexus can 
be understood through a meta-scale version of Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) three dimen-
sions of policy success: process, program, and politics. The remainder of this section explores 
these dimensions as they relate to the SDGs.
The process dimension is exhibited through, among other things, “legitimacy in the formation 
of choices: that is, produced through…values of democracy, deliberation and accountability” 
(Marsh and McConnell 2010; p. 571). As the most coherent single vision currently articulated 
by the global development community, the SDG project presents its drafting process as an 
exercise in endogenous collective or participatory action – even in the absence of any explicit 
mention of democracy in the most recent SDG official report4 and in the official description of 
SDG #16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions).5 The SDGs’ implicit deference to the princi-
ples of equity and inclusion is expressed through performative overtures to stakeholder en-
gagement in problem definition, options formulation, and program delivery (Fox and Stoett 
2016; Gellers 2016; Sénit et al. 2016). However, the terms of this engagement are not entirely 
impartial. As Durnova et al. (2016) note in reference to political engagement more generally, 
“all collective action, such as building a coalition to support a given proposal, is never natural, 
obvious, or neutral; on the contrary, it is always difficult and costly” (p. 38). Given the coor-
dination needs of the SDG project’s global scale, representative crowdsourcing of ideas would 
seem prohibitively complex. As such, localization – the city- or regional-scale interpretation 
and implementation of SDG targets – emerged as the preferred approach to building process le-
gitimacy. However, localization efforts are geographically heterogenous and at the global scale 
reflect the entire continuum of political systems, confounding technocratic efforts to build an 
empirically-based success-narrative that is universal and consistent.
The program dimension references the ability of a policy initiative to meet desired outcomes. 
Indicator-based monitoring on SDG effectiveness and efficiency targets legitimizes the em-
piricist approach and technocratic discourse around which SDG outcomes and successes are 
defined. The narrative-building mechanism of the program dimension is the institutional re-
inforcement of declared policy visions and technocratic pathways. For example, iterations of 
the UN’s 15-year development agendas – which so far include the Millennium Development 
Goals (2000-2015) and SDGs (2015-2030) – justify continued action through failure in achiev-
ing some targets and success in achieving others. Whether in the success or failure of program 
4 — https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2020/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2020.pdf (accessed 7 July 
2020). There is no explicit mention in the 2020 Sustainable Development Goals Report of the terms ‘democracy’ and 
‘participation,’ or their derivatives. ‘Deliberative’ is mentioned once, in reference to elected or representative councils. 
‘Representation’ and its derivatives, when used in reference to political processes, is mentioned 11 times, mostly in 
accounts about the election of women to elected or representative councils. ‘Inclusion’ and ‘inclusive’ are mentioned 
21 times, mainly as titles for individual goals; neither is defined or elaborated.
5 — https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2020/goal-16/ (accessed 7 July 2020).
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dimensions, the SDGs’ technocratic discourse is locked-in, maintains its urgency, and self-rein-
forces through cycles of need and resolution.
The final of Marsh and McConnell’s three dimensions is political success. The standards and 
measurement of political success differ between the SDG project’s global vision and national or 
subnational contexts. Macro-level political success for the SDGs is determined by the percep-
tions of global institutional actors and stakeholders about project legitimacy. National buy-
in is implied through the SDG ratification process. However, no formalized and systematic 
connection at the agenda-setting level appears to meaningfully exist between the SDGs and 
local governments. Material buy-in at the local level is observable only when cities and other 
subnational governments reference or engage with the SDGs in policymaking (Hartley 2019). 
At the same time, the fate of the SDGs’ political legitimacy, at any level of government, is 
arguably coterminous with that of the sustainability discourse more generally; for example, 
political debate rages about the degree to which governments at any level should commit public 
resources to address climate change. It is not clear, however, to what degree criticisms of the 
SDGs specifically are made in such debates (particularly at the local level), aside from general 
dissatisfaction about the subordination of local sovereignty to global interests (for discussions 
about this type of political agitation, see Ettinger 2020; LeRiche and Opitz 2019; Marschall 
and Klingebiel 2019; Lockwood 2018). While the sovereignty debate bears on the popular po-
litical acceptability of the SDGs, the legitimacy of the SDGs as perceived by local or national 
political leadership is contingent on the flexibility with which the SDGs can be discursively 
reframed to serve particular political and developmental objectives.
The process-program-politics perspective illuminates power dynamics in the discourses of glob-
al development. SDG legitimization can be seen as an exercise in hybrid pragmatism: the self-
certitude of numbers and totalizing vision of macro-level policy goals are combined with stated 
deference to context through localization. From a political economy perspective, the measure-
ment and subjective framing of SDG success differs among global, national, and local interests; 
this is the same challenge that has revealed itself in decades of development practice. In the 
face of contested declarations about success, the SDG discourse seeks to fortify itself against 
critical pushback by specifying indicator-based benchmarking and thereby disciplining local 
interpretation. However, this normalizing practice is impeded by substantial cross-country 
variation in depth, consistency, and methods of implementation and indicator measurement.6 
The SDGs’ discursive bias is therefore vulnerable to critique not only on political grounds but 
also on epistemological ones. Across policy domains both within and outside the development 
sphere, there are numerous ways to define and measure success; according to Nicklin (2019), 
“freed from numerical constraints, [policy] successes can be acknowledged in their multitudes” 
(p. 188). Given that implementation is currently the only arena for meaningful local engage-
ment with the SDGs (Glass and Newig 2019), power imbalances can be observed through the 
prism of core-periphery governance relationships and well-studied tensions between the me-
chanics and politics of policymaking. At the SDG visioning stage, alternative discourses about 
the causes of the sustainability crisis, particularly those that indict an economic system serv-
ing powerful and myopic interests, are largely invisible.
2. Technocracy and its discontents
Anti-expert and anti-intellectual populism on one side of the political spectrum, and anti-cap-
italist sentiment on the other, is confronting long-entrenched forms of governance includ-
6 — https://sdg-tracker.org/ (accessed 30 March 2020).
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ing those steeped in technocratic logic. Power imbalances and epistemological rigidity endure 
amidst the (often perfunctory) exercise of stakeholder engagement, suggesting underlying 
tensions at the confluence of the SDGs’ high-concept goals, more detailed targets, and action-
focused indicators. Global policy visions, as products of a high-modern technocratic exercise, 
are coercively imposed across politically distinct micro-contexts through the institution of lo-
calization. To explore this dynamic, this section discusses the conceptual provenance of tech-
nocracy as a backdrop for understanding the politics of epistemic disruption and pushback.
2.1 Conceptual provenance of technocracy
The entrenched credibility of technocracy in many policymaking circles draws from a deep 
intellectual legacy. Long mainstream in research about public policy and administration, de-
ductivist positivism appeals via technocratic logic to the practical needs of policymakers and 
politicians. It also well complements the measurement- and efficiency-focused reform ethic 
of administrative managerialism and periodic reinterpretations thereof. Connecting clearly 
defined problems with elegantly calibrated solutions, positivism relies on a constructed faith 
in the ‘common sense’ of empiricist governance, an idea timeless in both its allure and ability 
to reproduce power asymmetries (Riggsby 2019). However, policy issues having a high degree 
of ‘wickedness’ (Hartley et al. 2019; Head 2019) and ‘problemacity’ (lacking in structure; see 
Turnbull and Hoppe 2019) elude full reduction to measurable terms and are thus mismatched 
with positivist, technocratic, and even managerialist ways of thinking and governing (Scott 
1998). These types of problems confound an often willfully myopic epistemic that constructs 
and reshapes problem discourses to suit elite interests and available policy instruments.
By nature and intent, positivism sees only what is legible based on its own terms; encoded 
frames limit its field of analytical vision while effectively dismissing unmeasured context. In 
response, theoretical alternatives have emerged under the broad banner of postpositivism; 
these perspectives claim to better attend non-quantifiable factors shaping the contexts of poli-
cymaking, including political and social constructions of policy problems (Dryzek 2002). Car-
rying this response further, the ‘argumentative’ or ‘critical’ turn in policy studies, receiving 
scholarly attention primarily from the early 1990s onward, exemplifies postpositivism through 
discourse analysis and a focus on language, communications, and their service to power (Fis-
cher and Forester 1993). In its often inductive approach, postpositivism also accounts for sub-
altern discourses that escape the gaze of rigid analytical frames.
That policymaking remains a purely technocratic undertaking is, however, an illusion. Policy 
tools and instruments – long the currency of technocracy – are said to “reflect the political 
culture” (Schneider and Ingram 1990, p. 526) and “are mediated by wider features of a politi-
cal system” (Dunlop and Radaelli 2019, p. 130). Technocratic systems and policy design logics 
emerge from social and value-laden settings; neither materializes from a mythical purity of 
logic but is fashioned in politically and epistemically contested environments. Political realities 
lamented as ‘messy’ distractions often challenge the mechanics and logic of technocratic pro-
cesses; as such, politics can destabilize truth-claims that appear to be objective ‘common sense’ 
but are in practice the product of problem constructs serving elite interests. Technocratic dis-
courses can be seen as normative values that ossified into received wisdom; the privileged stead 
of this wisdom is protected not violently by the state but benignly and even obliviously by 
passive popular consensus, ideological self-disciplining, and social or cultural sanctioning. Ex-
amples are the practically unassailable institutions of capitalism and democracy; in the United 
States as in many other countries, opposing either is largely seen as irredeemably unpatriotic.
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2.2 The politics of epistemic disruption
Interests behind the political and commercial imperative to define, measure, and solve policy 
problems seek to cast technocratic fundamentalism as benevolent scientism. The empiricist 
language of traditional policy analysis, embodying a ‘common-sense’ understanding about 
problems while ostensibly transcending ideology (Majone 1989), sidesteps political pushback 
without explicitly dismissing it. However, the practical drawback of alternative epistemologi-
cal approaches in the mold of postpositivism is that they do not “connote a well-defined recipe 
book for doing policy analysis” (Dryzek, 2002; p. 32) and are thus consigned largely to the idle 
chatter of scholarship. In the absence of practicable alternatives, applied positivism continues 
to deepen its influence by leveraging the growing methodological sophistication of computing, 
scenario modeling, and technical forecasting. The accompanying empirical certitude privileges 
positivism among elite political and commercial circles, with increasingly convenient oppor-
tunities to operationalize and mainstream it (Kuecker and Hartley 2020b). While technocracy 
doubles-down on its positivist and managerialist logic, pushback may slowly be congealing 
into a techno-skepticism or ‘tech-lash’ (Krutka et al. 2020; Vraga and Tully 2019; Lynch 2007) 
that suggests insidious structural faults.7 These mounting tensions threaten to frustrate tech-
nology-based instrumental-rationalist efforts to frame policy problems, but the old order is 
unlikely to capitulate without a fight.
As a countervailing force emerging not from constructivist scholarship but from raw populist 
grievance, pushback against technocracy and its expression in policy logic has progressed from 
simmer to boil. The current manifestation of populism presents itself through a piquant whiff 
of anti-intellectualist rhetoric about policy issues in which science plays a central role, includ-
ing climate change, vaccinations, and virus mitigation (Amir Singh 2020). Whether the rising 
bluster against intellectual authority in government and science is only the panicky masculin-
ist posturing of an aggrieved working class is better left to political sociology, but the public 
policy implications cannot be ignored. It is arguably no great leap of inference to anticipate 
similar skepticism against technology (e.g., surveillance, data security, and autonomous robot-
ics) and against the broader process of mechanizing and metricizing society. When considering 
the targets of populist disdain, however, the connection between technology and predatory 
elitism has remained rhetorically incoherent until only recently.8 In scholarly circles, the con-
nection relies analytically on a critical discourse that sees technology as a tool serving privi-
leged interests while pacifying and even obstructing resistance. Such abstractions reflect the 
realities of populist pushback even if eluding full conceptual appreciation beyond the academy.
While categorically disparaging technocratic logic, the 21st century’s cohort of populist leaders 
builds its own credibility on instinctive, shoot-from-the-hip statesmanship in which experts 
are ridiculed and maligned as establishment operatives. In a profound paradox, the entrench-
ment of technocracy is in effect mediated by the seemingly nihilist politicization of received 
‘truth;’ the science of policymaking appears increasingly subordinated to the politics thereof. 
7 — The term ‘technofascism’ has emerged on both sides of the political spectrum: for American conservatives, it 
reflects a grievance against the alleged repression of conservative views by social media platforms like Twitter (Lewin-
ski 2020); for critical sociologists, it reflects a claim that technology is being used by ethno-nationalist politicians to 
marginalize minority populations during the COVID-19 crisis (Bhattacharyya and Subramaniam 2020). Policy action 
appears poised to respond to such sentiments; in June 2020, Santa Cruz, California, became the first American city to 
ban the use of technology-enabled ‘predictive policing’ that was seen as racially biased (Sturgill 2020).
8 — In the United States, the testimony of Facebook Founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg before Congress in 2019 
drew scorn and derision on a variety of unexpected grievances beyond the immediate topic. https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/10/24/business/dealbook/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-libra.html (accessed 24 July 2020).
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This potentially accelerates the long-running erosion of trust in government (Citrin and Stoker 
2018; Dalton 2005; Miller 1974) and the more recent erosion of trust in knowledge institutions 
and experts (Saarinen et al. 2019; Holst and Molander 2019; Baumgaertner et al. 2018). It also 
heralds a profound reckoning about the wisdom of experts as against that of ‘the masses,’ po-
tentially destabilizing the credibility of knowledge both ‘in and of’ (Lasswell 1971) the policy 
process. There is no clear resolution. As Fischer argues (2020; 2019), scientific truth is weak tea 
for anti-science denialism. ‘Post-truth’ populism rarely engages scientific claims at a meaning-
ful level, thus avoiding the likely prospect of losing debates held on empirical terms. Rather, 
the current strain of populism finds purchase in vilifying abstract bugbears like ‘big govern-
ment,’ the ‘deep state,’ global authoritarian projects like the SDGs, and the perceived aloofness 
of political and intellectual elites (Kane and Patapan 2014). While such rhetoric appears bereft 
of substance, it has no less a political consequence and thus deserves further investigation 
across all contested policy domains including global development and sustainability.
3. SDG localization as ‘critical pragmatism’
The concept of critical pragmatism mounts a challenge to elite capture in endeavors like the 
SDGs while offering pathways for the adoption of participatory approaches. Forester (2013; p. 
6) describes critical pragmatism through five dimensions: (i) focus on both process and out-
come; (ii) skepticism of knowledge claims and sensitivity to interests and values; (iii) distinc-
tion among facilitating, moderating, and mediating in deliberative processes; (iv) recognition 
of the essence of conflicts rather than only the language of debates; and (v) orientation towards 
creative negotiation in pursuit of joint gains. Critical pragmatism is applicable to both current 
and ideal manifestations of the SDG project in that, at its core, the concept accounts for rela-
tionships among power, knowledge, and stakeholders. Indeed, SDG localization enlists a com-
plex array of actors, institutional expectations, and values-based truth-claims – a policy arena 
that provides insights for understanding governance projects at any scale. This concluding sec-
tion focuses primarily on the assertion of interests and the dynamics of visioning processes as 
they shape SDG outcomes.
Driving SDG localization is said to be the reflective, contextualized, and variegated pursuit 
of a common normative outcome. The reality is not as tidy. The ambition to generate global 
consensus for a set of high-level policy visions can be seen as an exercise in manufactured 
harmonization – a normative imaginary for which localization is tacked-on as a mediating and 
democratizing mechanism. The cacophonous political environment of global policymaking and 
its core-periphery dynamics are reflected in Forester’s (2013; p. 10) elaboration of critical prag-
matism: “it…has to address actual possibilities – what we might really do – in situations char-
acterized by deep distrust and suspicion, deep differences of interests and values, a good deal 
of fear and, often, anger, poor or poorly distributed information, and more.” Viewing the SDG 
project through this lens captures the ‘pragmatic’ in acknowledging unique implementation 
contexts and the ‘critical’ in acknowledging the privilege of a single policy vision that claims a 
consensus mandate while effectively limiting implementation pathways through discursively 
strict framings of ‘success.’ 
An objective realization of the SDGs in their visionary purity is unlikely, but the collective ef-
fect of incidental monitoring efforts (whether at the country or local level9) offers convenient 
9 — Voluntary national reviews (VNRs) are undertaken by national governments to track progress on SDG imple-
mentation. Voluntary local reviews (VLRs) are the same for local or regional governments. https://sdg.iisd.org/news/
local-governments-commit-to-sdg-reporting-in-vlr-declaration/ (accessed 23 July 2020)
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support for the claim that the SDGs are being approximately achieved and thus discursively 
validated. Technocratic observation creates its own reality about progress, but critical prag-
matism intercedes by illuminating tensions between facts and values. From the perspective of 
local governments, SDG agenda-setting offered little meaningful or systematic engagement ac-
cording to Forester’s ‘process’ (collective agreement about visions and mechanics), but did con-
fer distributed responsibility for ‘outcomes’ (meeting targets and reporting progress). In many 
cases, however, local buy-in appears not to require normative coercion – indeed, SDG values 
comport at a superficial level with those embraced by many relatively ‘progressive’ urban gov-
ernments (Douglass et al. 2019; Einstein and Glick 2017). As long as these two align, however 
artificially, a seemingly imminent confrontation over power and influence can be conveniently 
delayed – with a discursive calm furthering the impression of progress and epistemic harmony.
The appeal to more meaningfully involve subnational governments reflects what Moloney and 
Stone (2019) argue, in other contexts, is the need to expand “analytical, theoretical, concep-
tual, and even our pedagogical approaches to include the kaleidoscope of global governance 
actors, levels of analysis, sectors, and concepts” (p. 104). Systematically soliciting the input 
of local governments, logistically complex though it may be, would add inclusivity to the SDG 
process, in particular by extending the influence of local actors from mere reinterpretation at 
the localization stage to strategic visioning at the agenda-setting stage. This provides a conduit 
for the ‘critical’ to shape the ‘pragmatic’ – and for the pragmatic to be more than a captive 
mechanism of technocratic discourses. This potential is currently unappreciated, as the value 
of strategic input is implicitly dismissed by claims that the interpretive implementation of the 
SDGs and the freedom to emphasize certain indicators sufficiently empower localities. 
As the only portal through which participation has an opportunity to act on the SDGs, locali-
zation can be considered at best ‘bounded’ in that it is steered by indicators whose function, 
beyond measuring implementation, is to deliver normative guidance. Furthermore, the failure 
of countries to monitor implementation on all indicators can be considered a reflection not 
merely of limited capacity (a time-worn explanation for developmental failure) but of efforts 
among local elites and policymakers to shape discourses by regulating what is seen and unseen. 
The SDGs are thus a teachable moment for epistemic revolution: the means of understanding 
reality dictate the content of discourse and what fails to be measured is ignored. An illustra-
tion is the clash between science and religious belief. Australian immunologist Edward Steele 
argues in reference to a current scientific debate about biological origins that “the situation is 
reminiscent to the problem Galileo had with the Catholic priests of his time – most refused to 
look through his telescope to observe the moons of Jupiter.”10 The power to constrain the scope 
of inquiry limits not only the array of feasible solutions but also any pathways to alternative 
understandings about problems; new ideas are dead on arrival. Democratizing inputs in the 
sustainability problem-framing process can potentially loosen the epistemic gridlock described 
in this essay.
Critical pragmatism would appear to deserve currency in a crisis-gripped era characterized by 
complex problems and global-scale response efforts – and in many countries by what seems 
to be late-stage democracy reflected in political dissonance and stalemates over contentious 
policy tradeoffs. The act of constructing consensus knowledge and policy discourses around 
global problems itself exposes tensions between scientific expertise and democratic repre-
sentation, reflecting Turnbull’s (2013) concept of problematology (the political process of con-
structing problems and repressing policy views). The policy scientist or benevolent technocrat, 
10 —  https://cosmosmagazine.com/space/astrobiology/the-return-of-panspermia/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
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as an individual in fact-value dissonance (Torgerson 2019), is a synthesis of policy and politics 
but remains deductive in spirit. Nevertheless, the durability and flexibility of pragmatism as 
a broader concept is open to re-readings from multiple epistemological perspectives (Zittoun 
2019).
In closing, technocracy has moved beyond its role as a method for understanding reality to 
now assertively delimit the policy community’s field of vision and associated rule-set; what 
cannot be measured, constructed, and validated technocratically cannot be managed. This has 
led to a dire mismatch between totalizing policy discourses like the SDGs and the gritty reali-
ties of context-based governing in local settings where sustainability challenges are confronted 
firsthand. Highlighting this dilemma, Fischer (2007) argues that “the standard methods [of 
professional training in public policy] are designed for a techno-bureaucratic society, not for a 
participatory democracy” (p. 107). Politically applied epistemics serve the construction of pre-
ferred realities, in both a contravention of purely positivist standards and a bastardized mani-
festation of postpositivist ones. However, the dynamic and perpetual ‘becoming’ of social and 
environmental change, as ostensibly recognized by the SDG project but structurally ignored 
by its totalizing and epistemically exclusionary logic, calls for approaches to problem-framing 
that are flexible and contextualized without interest in universality. This invites fresh schol-
arly contemplation on the study of power and discourse in a global policy system intent on 
making society ‘sustainable’ for the uninterrupted perpetuation of capitalism. This system is 
now thrashing about in the clutches of practical and ideological complexity, a backdrop against 
which formal discussions about the next iteration of the global development agenda will even-
tually commence.
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